Constitutional Dismemberment in Venezuela: An Authoritarian-Populist Constitutional Change Mechanism

Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No.641

Forthcoming. Richard Albert, Ed. Comparative Constitutional Reform in Latin America. Routledge

24 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2025 Last revised: 24 Jan 2025

See all articles by Daniela Urosa

Daniela Urosa

Boston College - Law School

Jose Ignacio Hernandez G.

Center for Strategic and International Studies; Central University of Venezuela (UCV); Catholic University Andres Bello (UCAB)

Date Written: January 01, 2024

Abstract

The Venezuelan Constitutional Law provides a framework that establishes material limits to amendments based on their impact on the Constitution's "fundamental principles and structure". The amendment and reform procedures do not apply to changes to the "fundamental principles and structure" embedded in Title I. Therefore, any constitutional change affecting that Title is a dismemberment and an illegitimate modification. This framework was designed to protect the supremacy of the Constitution but was ineffective due to populist abuses that decimate the rule of law. In that sense, the 2007 constitutional reform and the 2009 amendment were constitutional dismemberments that, however, were tolerated by the Constitutional Chamber, which supported the abusive interpretation of the Constitution. Even more, the Chamber adopted several rulings that purportedly construed loopholes, although in practical terms, introduced illegitimate mutations to the "fundamental principles and structure" of the Constitution. The main lesson from this experience is that the key element to identifying a dismemberment is the effect of the modification rather than its quantitative impact, considering the human rights centrality. A formalistic approach can justify amendments of only a few articles to simulate abusive reforms of the constitutional backbone with detrimental effects on human rights.

Keywords: Comparative and Foreign Law, Constitutional Law

Suggested Citation

Urosa M., Daniela and Hernandez G., José Ignacio, Constitutional Dismemberment in Venezuela: An Authoritarian-Populist Constitutional Change Mechanism (January 01, 2024). Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No.641, Forthcoming. Richard Albert, Ed. Comparative Constitutional Reform in Latin America. Routledge , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5086227 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5086227

Daniela Urosa M. (Contact Author)

Boston College - Law School ( email )

885 Centre Street
Newton, MA 02459-1163
United States

José Ignacio Hernandez G.

Center for Strategic and International Studies ( email )

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW
Washington D.C., DC 20036
United States

Central University of Venezuela (UCV) ( email )

University City
Los Chaguaramos
Caracas, 1050
Venezuela

Catholic University Andres Bello (UCAB) ( email )

Final Prolongacion Av Paez
Caracas, Montalban 1021
Venezuela

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
333
PlumX Metrics