Organizational Issues in the Agri-Food Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach

17 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2004  

Claude Menard

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Peter G. Klein

Baylor University, Department of Entrepreneurship; Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Strategy and Management; Mises Institute

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

International comparisons are increasingly popular in empirical studies of economic organization, financial-market performance, and political economy. Besides providing a broad set of firms and industries to compare, these studies highlight the interaction between the institutional environment - the "rules of the game" such as property rights, the legal system, the political process, and social norms - and the organizational arrangements trading partners design to govern their relationships. This paper outlines a research program comparing the economic organization of agriculture in the U.S. and European Union (E.U.). While both have highly developed agricultural sectors, there is substantial variation in organizational arrangements between and within the two. History and path dependence explain some of this variety, but other local conditions are important as well. For instance, European farms tend to be smaller than U.S. farms and more tightly interwoven with cities and tourist areas, so European agriculture is more closely tied with local economic, demographic, and cultural issues.

Keywords: organizational economics, comparative analysis, agriculture

JEL Classification: D23, L1, L2, Q13

Suggested Citation

Menard, Claude and Klein, Peter G., Organizational Issues in the Agri-Food Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach (January 2004). CORI Working Paper No. 04-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=509007 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.509007

Claude Menard

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12, place du Panthéon
Paris, IL
France

Peter G. Klein (Contact Author)

Baylor University, Department of Entrepreneurship ( email )

Waco, TX 76798
United States
254-710-4903 (Phone)

Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Strategy and Management ( email )

Breiviksveien 40
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

Mises Institute ( email )

Auburn, AL
United States

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