The Environmental Costs of Fiscal Distress: Evidence from China

55 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2025 Last revised: 24 Apr 2025

See all articles by ChaoLiang Liu

ChaoLiang Liu

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Xueyue Liu

Fudan University

Yu Liu

Fudan University - School of Economics

Cheng Zhao

Fudan University

Date Written: January 03, 2025

Abstract

Environmental regulations often fall short of achieving their intended goals. This paper investigates whether fiscal distress contributes to such failures. Leveraging the 2002 China Income Tax Reform—which substantially reduced the share of corporate income tax revenues allocated to local governments—as a natural experiment, we find that cities facing larger revenue shortfalls were more likely to see increased pollution from firms. Specifically, our analysis reveals that a 1% decline in tax revenue led to a 1.4% increase in firm sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, caused by an expansion in firm production. Our results are likely driven by local governments adopting more lenient environmental regulations that promote firm expansion. The environmental cost associated solely with SO2 emissions during this period of fiscal distress is estimated to account for 10 percent of China’s total environmental protection investment in 2005. 

Suggested Citation

Liu, ChaoLiang and Liu, Xueyue and Liu, Yu and Zhao, Cheng,

The Environmental Costs of Fiscal Distress: Evidence from China

(January 03, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5096325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5096325

ChaoLiang Liu

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Xueyue Liu

Fudan University ( email )

Beijing West District Baiyun Load 10th
Shanghai, 100045
China

Yu Liu (Contact Author)

Fudan University - School of Economics ( email )

600 GuoQuan Road
Shanghai, 200433
China
02165642263 (Phone)

Cheng Zhao

Fudan University ( email )

Beijing West District Baiyun Load 10th
Shanghai, 100045
China

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