Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

21 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2004

See all articles by Helmut Bester

Helmut Bester

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2004

Abstract

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Keywords: Timing of conflict, war, easy targets

JEL Classification: B31, D74, H77

Suggested Citation

Bester, Helmut and Konrad, Kai A., Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (February 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=510144

Helmut Bester

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

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Munich, 80539
Germany

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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