Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004
12 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2004 Last revised: 5 May 2009
Date Written: 2004
This paper examines the specific features of the shareholder access rule recently proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I suggest that, even accepting the Commission's generally cautious approach and its desire to limit shareholder access to cases where the need for it is evident, the restrictions included in the rule proposal are excessive and should be relaxed. In particular, I identify several changes in these restrictions that would contribute to attaining the policy goals that the proposed rule seeks to serve.
Keywords: corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate ballot, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC.
JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Designing a Shareholder Access Rule (2004). Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=511882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.511882