Designing a Shareholder Access Rule

Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461

12 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2004 Last revised: 5 May 2009

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

This paper examines the specific features of the shareholder access rule recently proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I suggest that, even accepting the Commission's generally cautious approach and its desire to limit shareholder access to cases where the need for it is evident, the restrictions included in the rule proposal are excessive and should be relaxed. In particular, I identify several changes in these restrictions that would contribute to attaining the policy goals that the proposed rule seeks to serve.

Keywords: corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate ballot, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC.

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., Designing a Shareholder Access Rule (2004). Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 12, pp. 28-32, 2004, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 461, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=511882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.511882

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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