Meaningful Collective Bargaining in College Football’s Next Chapter

28 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2025

See all articles by Nicholas Shiach

Nicholas Shiach

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: January 14, 2025

Abstract

It is now becoming clearer that college football players may have a right to compensation, and players, courts, and even some college sports administrators agree that collective bargaining would be beneficial. So, the crucial question is, how college football players can achieve a meaningful bargaining relationship that would not harm the college football industry? The leading proposals by academics, legislators, and agencies are to (1) use labor law’s joint employer doctrine to allow athletes to bargain with the NCAA or their athletic conference, in addition to their school, (2) allow only intra-conference collective bargaining for college football players under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, or “the Act,” 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-164), and (3) carve out college football from the NCAA and encourage players to form a nationwide union that is limited to bargaining only over certain topics. These proposals would make union organizing more difficult for college football players and would not foster stability in the labor market. Each of the proposals would prevent college football players from fully self-determining their bargaining units, while the third proposal would create a union effectively controlled by administrators. The best way for athletes to have self-determination and meaningful collective bargaining is for Congress to amend the NLRA to allow college football players to define the scope of their appropriate collective bargaining unit as they see fit.

Keywords: Collective Bargaining, College Football, NCAA, Players' Union, Labor, NLRB, Bargaining Unit, Company Union, Joint Employer, Communities of Interest

JEL Classification: J53, J83

Suggested Citation

Shiach, Nicholas, Meaningful Collective Bargaining in College Football’s Next Chapter (January 14, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5120779 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5120779

Nicholas Shiach (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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