Averting the Nazi Seizure of Power: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment

34 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2004

See all articles by Christian Stögbauer

Christian Stögbauer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics

John Komlos

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

The Great Depression in Germany led to the radicalization of the electorate, leading the country and then the world into the darkest days of Western Civilization. Could it have been otherwise? This paper explores whether the NSDAP takeover might have been averted with a fiscal policy that lowered the unemployment rate in those parts of Germany where their support rose most rapidly. A counterfactual simulation model based on estimates of the relationship between unemployment and the radical vote at the electoral district level provides a framework for considering how much lower unemployment would have to have been in those districts to prevent the NSDAP from becoming a formidable political force in Germany. Budget neutrality is maintained, so that the simulations do not depend on an expanded fiscal policy. The results indicate that such a policy could well have averted the NSDAP's seizure of power, and the catastrophe that followed in its wake.

Keywords: Great Depression, Germany, counterfactual simulation model, NSDAP

JEL Classification: N14, N44

Suggested Citation

Stögbauer, Christian and Komlos, John, Averting the Nazi Seizure of Power: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment (2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=512322 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.512322

Christian Stögbauer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Akademiestr.1/III
Munich, D-80539
Germany

John Komlos (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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