Robust Exchange under Single-Peaked Preferences

18 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2025 Last revised: 24 Mar 2025

See all articles by Yuichiro Kamada

Yuichiro Kamada

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Yosuke Yasuda

The University of Osaka - Graduate School of Economics

Date Written: February 04, 2025

Abstract

Kamada and Yasuda (2025) consider the standard housing exchange problem of Shapley and Scarf (1974) with a constraint on the cycle size. This paper shows that their impossibility results-there is no mechanism with certain desirable properties-continue to hold under the restricted domain of single-peaked preferences except for some special cases. One important case is where the cycle size is restricted to be at most 2, where we construct a strategy-proof mechanism that always induces a constrained efficient exchange that respects the cycle size constraint.

Keywords: cycle size, efficiency, single-peaked preferences

Suggested Citation

Kamada, Yuichiro and Yasuda, Yosuke, Robust Exchange under Single-Peaked Preferences (February 04, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5124793 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5124793

Yuichiro Kamada (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Yosuke Yasuda

The University of Osaka - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan

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