Women Politicians and Economic Growth

Abstract

In 2001, China implemented a gender-quota rule for local politicians. We document that, for a period running from 2001 through 2018, Chinese cities under the administration of female political leaders experienced GDP growth rates that were 0.3%–0.5% lower than the rates in male-led cities. This gender–growth relationship holds even after including province*year fixed effects to account for time-varying province-level factors. The relationship also holds after including city fixed effects, which allows us to compare economic growth in a given city between female-led periods and male-led periods. The results are robust in a difference-in-differences test and using an instrumental-variable design. We also find that local stock prices drop when news of female leadership appointments becomes public, while such prices remain flat following news of male appointments. The gender–growth relationship weakens in later years of our sample period, likely reflecting the weakening of the gender-quota rule constraint. The gender–growth relationship is stronger in regions where gender discrimination is more likely to occur. We also document that female leaders’ qualifications are poorer but they are more likely to be promoted than their male counterparts. 

Keywords: gender, economic growth, gender discrimination, gender quota, China JEL Code: D72, D78, H44, H75

JEL Classification: D72, D78, H44, H75