Decisions under Risk Are Decisions under Complexity: Comment

76 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2025

See all articles by Daniel Banki

Daniel Banki

ESADE Business School

Uri Simonsohn

ESADE Business School

Robert Walatka

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

George Wu

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: February 06, 2025

Abstract

A re-analysis of Oprea (2024)'s data suggests that that measurement error produced by a confusing experimental design underlies the provocative claim that prospect theory's risk attitudes reflect mistakes arising from "complexity" rather than underlying preferences. In the reported studies, participants valued risky lotteries (e.g., a 10% chance of $25) and riskless "mirrors" of those lotteries (e.g., 10% of $25 for sure) with similar means, exhibiting the fourfold pattern and loss aversion for both. This equivalence, however, was driven by the 75% of subjects who erred on comprehension questions. These subjects produced excessively noisy data, with first-order stochastic dominance violation rates 5 to 10 times higher than in previous studies. The remaining 25% of subjects largely valued mirrors at their expected value and lotteries in line with prospect theory. Participants with a higher likelihood of understanding experimental instructions (e.g., students over online subjects, STEM majors, better-compensated, higher CRT scorers) behaved more in line with prospect theory for lotteries than mirrors.

Keywords: JEL classification: C91, D81, D91 Risk preferences, prospect theory, complexity, probability weighting, loss aversion

Suggested Citation

Banki, Daniel and Simonsohn, Uri and Walatka, Robert and Wu, George, Decisions under Risk Are Decisions under Complexity: Comment (February 06, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5127515 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5127515

Daniel Banki

ESADE Business School ( email )

Av. de Pedralbes, 60-62
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Uri Simonsohn

ESADE Business School ( email )

Av. de Pedralbes, 60-62
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Robert Walatka

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

George Wu (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,443
Abstract Views
3,629
Rank
28,474
PlumX Metrics