The Effects of Tenure-Track Systems on Selection and Productivity in Economics

Abstract

This paper examines how publication-based tenure-track systems affect the careers of Ph.D. graduates in Economics. We leverage a 2010 reform in Italy that replaced open-ended assistant professor (AP) positions with fixed-term contracts and introduced publication minimum requirements for career advancement. Using survey and administrative data, along with a Difference-inDifferences Event-Study approach comparing Economics to less academicallyoriented fields, we find that the reform significantly reduced the likelihood of Economics Ph.D. graduates entering academia in Italy, while increasing transitions to academic careers abroad or to public and private sector jobs. Talented graduates were disproportionately affected, revealing negative selection into Italian academia following the removal of permanent AP positions. Despite these trends, tenure-track hires tend to publish more in high-ranking journals, suggesting that the reform’s incentive effects may partly mitigate its negative selection effects.

Keywords: academic careers, fertility, Publications, Tenure