Anti-Dumping Law as a Collusive Device

17 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2004

See all articles by Maurizio Zanardi

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Abstract

In the United States many anti-dumping petitions are withdrawn before the investigations are completed. Prusa (1992) argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to induce foreign industries into collusive agreements. In his model, all anti-dumping petitions should be withdrawn, which is not the case. This paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn. Withdrawal depends on two key parameters: coordination cost and bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. A new data set is constructed to test the model on the U.S. experience for the period 1980-97. The econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model.

JEL Classification: F13, D43

Suggested Citation

Zanardi, Maurizio, Anti-Dumping Law as a Collusive Device. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=513406

Maurizio Zanardi (Contact Author)

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
1,071
PlumX Metrics