International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator

23 Pages Posted: 8 Apr 2004

See all articles by William H. Kaempfer

William H. Kaempfer

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Anton D. Lowenberg

California State University, Northridge - Department of Economics

William Mertens

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Abstract

Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression, as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition.

Suggested Citation

Kaempfer, William H. and Lowenberg, Anton D. and Mertens, William, International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator. Economics & Politics, Vol. 16, pp. 29-51, March 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=513527

William H. Kaempfer

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309-0256
United States
303-492-4486 (Phone)
303-492-8960 (Fax)

Anton D. Lowenberg (Contact Author)

California State University, Northridge - Department of Economics ( email )

18111 Nordhoff Street
Northridge, CA 91330
United States

William Mertens

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
303-492-3021 (Phone)

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