AI as Agency without Intelligence: On Artificial Intelligence as a New Form of Artificial Agency and the Multiple Realisability of Agency Thesis

Abstract

When interpreting Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, we face a clear choice: either to expand our current conception of intelligence to include artificial forms of it (the Artificial Realisability of Intelligence or ARI thesis), or to expand our understanding of agency to encompass multiple forms, including artificial ones that do not require cognition, intelligence, intention, or mental states (the Multiple Realisability of Agency or MRA thesis). This article argues that scientific evidence, common sense, Ockham's razor, and an increasing body of scholarly research favour the MRA thesis over the ARI thesis. Accordingly, AI is better understood as a new form of agency without intelligence. By employing the Method of Abstraction, this article provides a comparative analysis of various forms of agency-natural, biological, animal social, artefactual, human, and social-to identify the defining characteristics of AI as a novel kind of agency. Reconceptualising AI as Artificial Agency avoids biological and anthropomorphic fallacies, improves our understanding of AI's distinct features, and provides a stronger foundation for addressing the challenges and opportunities posed by AI technologies, as well as their future development and societal impact.

Keywords: Agency Theory, Artificial Agency, Artificial Intelligence, Comparative Analysis, Method of Abstraction