Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia

Posted: 27 Oct 1999

See all articles by Sheoli Pargal

Sheoli Pargal

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

David Wheeler

World Bank - Policy Research Department

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

When formal regulation is weak or absent, communities often use other channels to induce pollution abatement by local factories in a process of "informal regulation." The resulting "pollution equilibrium" reflects the relative bargaining power of the community and the plant. This note uses Indonesian data from 1989-90 on plant-level organic water pollution to test the informal regulation hypothesis.

JEL Classification: Q25, Q20, O13

Suggested Citation

Pargal, Sheoli and Wheeler, David, Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 104, No. 6 (December 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5136

Sheoli Pargal (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

David Wheeler

World Bank - Policy Research Department ( email )

1818 H Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/dwheeler

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