Informative Price Pressure

42 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2025

See all articles by Salman Arif

Salman Arif

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Zhi Da

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Wenwei Lin

Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

Date Written: February 13, 2025

Abstract

Informed investors often hedge their stock bets right before FOMC meetings. The resulting price pressure, when aggregated across stocks, reveals their long-term view of the stock market (with a minus sign). Consistent with this, we find that the average stock market return on the day before recent FOMC meetings, while completely reverted the next day, strongly and negatively predicts stock market returns up to two years in the future. The market return predictability is robust to additional controls, various sample cuts and extends to other important macroeconomic announcements. The day before the FOMC meeting is associated with low informed trading intensity, which explains the decision of informed investors to hedge on that day. At the same time, the VIX index is higher on that day, resulting in detectable price pressure.

Keywords: Price pressure, hedging, informed trading, FOMC meetings

Suggested Citation

Arif, Salman and Da, Zhi and Lin, Wenwei, Informative Price Pressure (February 13, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5136393 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5136393

Salman Arif

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/salman-arif

Zhi Da (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )

Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Wenwei Lin

Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen ( email )

2001 Longxiang Boulevard, Longgang District
Shenzhen, 518172

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