Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture

21 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2004

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Sigve Tjotta

University of Bergen - Department of Economics

Abstract

Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical data or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. The female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of two forms of joint venture where more labor division makes her more exploitable by her partner. More specifically, the random profit of the joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in the case of a full engagement whereas marriage bargaining is procedurally fair in the case of a low engagement. Our treatment variables are her and his outside options representing different attitudes to investing in human capital.

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta and Tjotta, Sigve, Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=513784

Werner Güth (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) ( email )

Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

Sigve Tjotta

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
833
PlumX Metrics