Minimum Wage with Optimal Income Taxation

20 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2004

See all articles by Efraim Sadka

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Tomer Blumkin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2004

Abstract

Minimum wage legislation is a standard policy tool in most countries. However, the overall merits of minimum wage are controversial due to its potential adverse effects on unemployment. In this paper we construct a simple model in which minimum wage plays an important re-distributive role, alongside income taxation, without generating adverse effects on unemployment.

JEL Classification: H2, D6

Suggested Citation

Sadka, Efraim and Blumkin, Tomer, Minimum Wage with Optimal Income Taxation (February 2004). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1125. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=514223

Efraim Sadka (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9712 (Phone)
+972 3 642 8074 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tomer Blumkin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2268 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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