Did Board Gender Quotas Break the Glass Ceiling in Europe?

AEA Papers and Proceedings, Forthcoming

14 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2025

See all articles by David A. Matsa

David A. Matsa

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amalia R. Miller

University of Virginia - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 12, 2025

Abstract

Nine European countries adopted gender quotas for companies' boards of directors between 2005 and 2021, before the European Parliament adopted an EU-wide quota in 2022. Using 25 years of data, we estimate the quotas' effects on female shares of corporate directors and senior executives of large public companies. We find that while the female share of nonexecutive directors increased by 20 percentage points within six years after a quotas' adoption, women's representation among CEOs or other senior executives hardly changed. These results suggest that policymakers interested in increasing gender diversity among senior executives might need to consider more targeted policies.

Keywords: female leadership, gender quotas, corporate diversity, discrimination

JEL Classification: J16, J44, J71, J78, K22, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Matsa, David A. and Miller, Amalia R., Did Board Gender Quotas Break the Glass Ceiling in Europe? (January 12, 2025). AEA Papers and Proceedings, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5148149 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5148149

David A. Matsa (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
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847-491-8337 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Amalia R. Miller

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~am5by/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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