Forum Shopping and Forum Selling in German Patent Litigation: A Quantitative Analysis

31 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2025

See all articles by Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer

Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer

University of Hohenheim - Institute of Economics

Alexander Morell

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Law; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Date Written: February 17, 2025

Abstract

Using data on all patent cases in front of German courts between 2010 and 2015 we find that plaintiffs in patent infringement cases mainly chose the venue where to sue by the speed with which courts dispose of their cases. We also find that quality – measured, both, as the fraction of cases challenged in the next instance and the ratio of successful appeals in the year before filing – has an impact on court choice by patent plaintiffs. We can further show that plaintiffs merely shop between three German courts, namely Duesseldorf, Munich and Mannheim. Moreover, we find that once one of these three courts introduces an additional panel of three judges, thereby working faster, the other two courts increase their working speed, too. This indicates that, indeed, courts actively compete for cases. However, we do not find evidence for courts reacting to a competitor’s increase in speed by deciding in the plaintiffs favor more often or by deteriorating quality of decisions.

Keywords: Organizational Behavior, Intellectual Property, Litigation, Patents and Innovation

JEL Classification: D23, K11, K41, O34

Suggested Citation

Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Sibylle and Morell, Alexander, Forum Shopping and Forum Selling in German Patent Litigation: A Quantitative Analysis (February 17, 2025). SAFE Working Paper No. 443, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5150950 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5150950

Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer (Contact Author)

University of Hohenheim - Institute of Economics ( email )

Schloss-Mittelhof (Ost)
70593 Stuttgart
Germany

Alexander Morell

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Law ( email )

Frankfurt
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt, 60323
Germany

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