Achieving Stability? Forms and Arenas of Institutional and National Balances in the Draft Constitutional Treaty

The Federal Trust Constitutional Online Paper Series No. 06/04

13 Pages Posted: 10 Mar 2004

Date Written: March 2004

Abstract

The Draft Constitutional Treaty (DCT) strengthens some of the federal features of the future European political order, allowing us to extrapolate standards for assessing the changes from the political philosophy of federalism. Stable and legitimate federal political orders require multiple forms of balancing, and many of the changes in the DCT are improvements on the Nice Treaty in these regards. The DCT goes some way toward creating a federal European political order more likely to both merit and facilitate trust and trustworthiness among Europeans. Such trust is crucial if the institutions are to foster willing support and "dual loyalty" toward both one's own member state and toward the union as a whole among the citizenry and officials.

Keywords: federalism, draft Constitutional Treaty, trust

Suggested Citation

Follesdal, Andreas, Achieving Stability? Forms and Arenas of Institutional and National Balances in the Draft Constitutional Treaty (March 2004). The Federal Trust Constitutional Online Paper Series No. 06/04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=515823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.515823

Andreas Follesdal (Contact Author)

Pluricourts ( email )

P.O. Box 6706
St. Olavs plass 5
0130 Oslo
Norway

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