Self-Interested Routing in Queuing Networks

Stanford University GSB Research Paper No. 1782 (R)

39 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2004

See all articles by Sunil Kumar

Sunil Kumar

Independent

Ali K. Parlakturk

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Operations Area

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule used, and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a non-trivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation due to self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.

Suggested Citation

Kumar, Sunil and Parlakturk, Ali K., Self-Interested Routing in Queuing Networks (January 2004). Stanford University GSB Research Paper No. 1782 (R). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=516003 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.516003

Sunil Kumar (Contact Author)

Independent

No Address Available

Ali K. Parlakturk

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Operations Area ( email )

300 Kenan Center Drive
Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
(919) 962-3181 (Phone)

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