Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico

28 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2004

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Gunnar Niels

Oxford Economic Research Associates (OXERA) Consulting Ltd.

Date Written: March 2004

Abstract

We examine the role of political factors in Mexico's anti-dumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to anti-dumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on anti-dumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the US and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.

Keywords: Anti-dumping, political economy of trade policy, Mexico, endogenous import protection, endogenous tariffs

JEL Classification: F10, F13

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Niels, Gunnar, Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico (March 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4297. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=516081

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

Gunnar Niels

Oxford Economic Research Associates (OXERA) Consulting Ltd. ( email )

Park Central
40/41 Park End Street
Oxford OX1 1JD
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 1865 253 000 (Phone)
+44 (0) 1865 251 172 (Fax)

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