Accountability under incumbent 

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See all articles by José Ramón Enríquez

José Ramón Enríquez

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Horacio Larreguy

ITAM

John Marshall

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Alberto Simpser

ITAM

Date Written: January 31, 2025

Abstract

Political polarization can weaken electoral accountability by shaping how citizens process information. We examine the impact of disseminating incumbent performance information on voting behavior in a polarized setting and assess the mitigating role of a debiasing nudge. We experimentally evaluate a local CSO's Facebook ad campaign that delivered COVID-19 case and death statistics to over 2 million unique users across 500 Mexican municipalities ahead of the 2021 elections. Polling-station-level results reveal that the information alone backfired: it increased (decreased) incumbent support in areas with high (low) COVID-19 impact. These effects are driven by areas with strong prior incumbent support, prevalent communal values, and higher stress indicators among citizens. However, a debiasing nudge provided before the information reversed this effect, resulting in voters rewarding (punishing) incumbents with low (high) COVID-19 impact. Our findings underscore how biases in information processing undermine electoral accountability in polarized contexts and demonstrate the potential for nudges to restore it.

Keywords: Social media, motivated reasoning, nudge, debiasing

Suggested Citation

Enríquez, José Ramón and Larreguy, Horacio and Marshall, John and Simpser, Alberto, Accountability under incumbent  (January 31, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

José Ramón Enríquez

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Horacio Larreguy (Contact Author)

ITAM ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico
10700 (Fax)

John Marshall

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Alberto Simpser

ITAM ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Mexico City, CDMX 01080
Mexico
+525556284000 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.albertosimpser.com

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