Corporate Delinquency Rates: The Rise of Zombie Companies 

Abstract

Corporate delinquency rates are increasing, with hours of effort being put into rescuing the wealth of many European countries in the world's interlock. However, even though this is a struggle against most of the losses ever suffered by any advanced capitalist community, it is receiving scant attention in the international press. The corporate delinquency rate is figured, the former in the growth of financially distressed great corporations and the latter in the spread of imminent insolvency among such corporations (Göbel & Tavares, 2022). Although America's current predicament is the most acute, it is no exception to the trend. Since about 1975, a disturbing trend has developed in the advanced capitalist economies from the performance of the corporate business sector. Corporate profitability in the industry has steadily fallen while debts have risen. The two operating results of these developments are adequate to underline how disturbing they are, corporate delinquency as manifested in either a Welby fall in the corporation's profits in absolute terms or else its inability to meet both the interest and redemption payments on its debts out of profits. The rise in corporate delinquency rates has severe economic consequences. Increased overhead costs due to the sheer mass of the corporate bodies, termination to rationalise the productive process of the sector, increased wage pressure, with demands for higher money wages in industries with deep pockets, and a downturn in 'business confidence' are just some of the problems raised by the threat looms on an economy is a lot of the corporations in the sector. There are superficial similarities between the present situation and that of the start of the great depression of the 1930s; not only broadly similar underlying historical trends, but the very failure of the delinquency rate to recede shows how difficult it is to get out of the damaging economic consequences of its period of growth. An additional purpose behind this analysis was to examine government responses to these delinquency rate movements to see what might be learned for the present time. It is shown that although there is no iron law to be discerned from past 1 | P g e events, the arguments of institutional imperatives are, on the one hand, that concerted effort must be made to check the rise of the corporate delinquency rate as soon as possible.