Better Stealing Than Dealing: How do Felony Theft Thresholds Impact Crime?

37 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2025

See all articles by Stephen B. Billings

Stephen B. Billings

University of Colorado - Boulder

Michael D. Makowsky

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics

Kevin Schnepel

Simon Fraser University (SFU)

Adam Soliman

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics

Date Written: March 07, 2025

Abstract

From 2005 to 2019, forty US states increased the dollar value threshold delineating misdemeanor and felony theft, reducing the expected punishment for a subset of property crimes. Using an event study framework, we observe significant and growing increases in theft after a state reform is passed. We then show that reduced sanctions for theft have broader effects in the market for illegal activity. Consistent with a mechanism of substitution across income-generating crimes, we find decreases in both drug distribution crimes and the probability that a released offender previously convicted of drug distribution is reincarcerated for a new drug conviction.

Keywords: crime, theft, felony, punishment

JEL Classification: K4, H0

Suggested Citation

Billings, Stephen B. and Makowsky, Michael D. and Schnepel, Kevin and Soliman, Adam, Better Stealing Than Dealing: How do Felony Theft Thresholds Impact Crime? (March 07, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5169572 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5169572

Stephen B. Billings

University of Colorado - Boulder ( email )

Leeds School of Business
Koelbel Building
Boulder, CO US 80309
United States

Michael D. Makowsky

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States

HOME PAGE: http://michaelmakowsky.com

Kevin Schnepel

Simon Fraser University (SFU)

Adam Soliman (Contact Author)

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States

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