Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information

Posted: 16 Mar 2004

See all articles by James E. Bessen

James E. Bessen

Technology & Policy Research Initiative, BU School of Law

Abstract

When innovation is cumulative, early patentees can hold up later innovators. Under complete information, licensing before R&D avoids holdup. But when development costs are private information, ex ante licensing may only occur in regimes with sub-optimal patent policy.

Keywords: Patents, licensing, innovation, intellectual property

JEL Classification: K3, L5, O3

Suggested Citation

Bessen, James E., Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=517023

James E. Bessen (Contact Author)

Technology & Policy Research Initiative, BU School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

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