The Electoral Consequences of Ideological Persuasion: Evidence from a Within-Precinct Analysis of U.S. Elections

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See all articles by Adam Bonica

Adam Bonica

Stanford University

Kasey Rhee

Stanford University; Dartmouth College

Nicolas Studen

Stanford University

Date Written: January 22, 2025

Abstract

Most research on the electoral penalty of candidate ideology relies on betweendistrict or longitudinal comparisons, which are confounded by turnout and ballot composition effects. We employ a within-precinct design using granular precinct-level election data from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2016-2022) alongside comprehensive data on candidate ideology. By analyzing within-precinct variation in two-party vote shares for contests simultaneously appearing on the same ballot, we isolate the effect of ideology on vote choice among a fixed electorate. We estimate how voters respond to candidate ideology in terms of vote choice across diverse electoral contexts, holding turnout fixed. A standard deviation change in the midpoint between candidates results in an average vote share penalty of 0.6 percentage points. The effect varies with office type, information availability, incumbency status, and partisan geography. Overall, we find that gains associated with ideological moderation are relatively modest and likely secondary to turnout effects.

Suggested Citation

Bonica, Adam and Rhee, Kasey and Studen, Nicolas, The Electoral Consequences of Ideological Persuasion: Evidence from a Within-Precinct Analysis of U.S. Elections (January 22, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Adam Bonica (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Kasey Rhee

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Dartmouth College ( email )

Department of Sociology
Hanover, NH 03755
United States

Nicolas Studen

Stanford University ( email )

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