Elite Networks and Personalized Rule

Abstract

The breakdown of democracy by elected incumbents has become a global phenomenon. The existing literature falls short in adequately explaining how populist-minded strongmen ascend to power within party organizations. We argue that party personalization precedes democratic backsliding, as would-be autocrats often dominate their party institutions before aggrandizing executive authority at the national level. We analyze the elite networks of Turkey's ruling party, focusing on two key units: the Central Decision-making and Administrative Committee and the Cabinet, whose members occupy pivotal roles within the party and regime. Using an original dataset of 320 individuals who served in leadership positions in the governing party over the course of 22 years and network analysis, we demonstrate that party personalization intensified well before democratic breakdown. These findings reveal that potential autocrats consolidate their control over party structures as a precursor to undermining institutional and electoral barriers. We contribute to the literature on democratic backsliding and elite networks, highlighting the subtle nature of party personalization, which can occur even in regimes considered democratic.