Federalism in Telecommunications Regulation: Effectiveness and Accuracy of State Commission Implementation of Telric in Local Telecoms Markets

12 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2004

See all articles by Lawrence J. Spiwak

Lawrence J. Spiwak

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Date Written: March 9, 2004

Abstract

This Policy Bulletin makes use of regression analysis to demonstrate that differences in UNE-P prices both across States and within States are due to genuine cost differences and differences in TELRIC, and are not because of regulatory failure by the States. These findings confirm an obvious principle of Federalism: the States are clearly in a much better position than bureaucrats in Washington to ensure that any government intervention in the market has a true nexus to those consumers and businesses directly affected by such regulation. The analysis also shows that over time unbundled loop prices are converging to TELRIC and not to some other cost standard. Thus, findings presented in this Policy Bulletin show clearly that the States are well qualified to implement the FCC's TELRIC rules and have done so with accuracy.

Keywords: Federalism, telecommunications, TELRIC, 1996 Telecom Act

JEL Classification: K23, L10, L50, L51, L96, O33, 038

Suggested Citation

Spiwak, Lawrence J., Federalism in Telecommunications Regulation: Effectiveness and Accuracy of State Commission Implementation of Telric in Local Telecoms Markets (March 9, 2004). Phoenix Center Policy Bulletin No. 9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=518962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.518962

Lawrence J. Spiwak (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

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