Corporate Governance for Platform Workers

25 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2025 Last revised: 1 May 2025

See all articles by Grant M. Hayden

Grant M. Hayden

Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law

Matthew T. Bodie

University of Minnesota Law School

Date Written: March 13, 2025

Abstract

Regardless of their status under employment law, we believe that corporate law holds untapped potential in reshaping the rights and working conditions of platform workers. While the law of corporate governance remains aligned with shareholder interests, the collapse of the law-and-economics underpinnings of shareholder primacy should prompt us to develop new approaches to corporate governance. In this Essay, we briefly set out three alternative models for determining whether stakeholders should participate in corporate governance: a democratic participation model, a theory of the firm model, and an information theory model. All are fully consistent with the precepts of standard economics that dominate corporate law theory, and they counsel in favor of extending governance rights to platform workers regardless of how they’re classified under labor and employment law. This reimagined corporate governance could provide avenues for platform workers to influence the firm policies that directly affect them as well as give them a degree of control over their working lives.

Suggested Citation

Hayden, Grant M. and Bodie, Matthew T., Corporate Governance for Platform Workers (March 13, 2025). 99 Chicago-Kent Law Review 75 (2025), Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 25-21, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 688, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5191865 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5191865

Grant M. Hayden (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, TX 75275
United States

Matthew T. Bodie

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

United States

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