Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports

13 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2004

See all articles by Stefan Szymanski

Stefan Szymanski

Imperial College London - Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine

Stefan Kesenne

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics; KU Leuven - Faculty of Physical Education and Physiotherapy

Abstract

This paper shows that under reasonable conditions, increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.

Suggested Citation

Szymanski, Stefan and Kesenne, Stefan, Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 52, pp. 165-177, March 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=519224

Stefan Szymanski (Contact Author)

Imperial College London - Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine ( email )

Exhibition Road
London, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
+44 20 7594 9107 (Phone)
+44 20 7823 7685 (Fax)

Stefan Kesenne

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, B-2000
Belgium

KU Leuven - Faculty of Physical Education and Physiotherapy

Tervuursevest, 101
Heverlee, B-3001
Belgium

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