Bank Capital and Liquidity Risk: Influence of Crisis and Regulatory Intervention

57 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2025

See all articles by Mamiza Haq

Mamiza Haq

Newcastle University Business School

Nikhil Srivastava

Bennett University

Zihe Wang

Independent

Ziheng Wang

Northwest Minzu University

Zihe Wang

University of Queensland

Date Written: October 14, 2024

Abstract

This study analyses how capital affects asset and liability liquidity risk in U.S. commercial banks during stable and crisis periods. We find that higher capital increases idiosyncratic liquidity risk by boosting cash and near-cash assets, raising fed funds sold, and reducing fed funds purchased. On the liability side, there is a shift from liquid to investment deposits and an increase in off-balance-sheet items. These patterns hold across crises, with some variation during covid-19 period. Our findings suggest that policymakers must balance capital regulations and ensure tailored crisis interventions and monitoring for specific liquidity components. Our results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications.

Keywords: liquidity risk, bank capital, crises, regulatory intervention

JEL Classification: G28

Suggested Citation

Haq, Mamiza and Srivastava, Nikhil and Wang, Zihe and Wang, Ziheng and Wang, Zihe, Bank Capital and Liquidity Risk: Influence of Crisis and Regulatory Intervention (October 14, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5194541 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5194541

Mamiza Haq (Contact Author)

Newcastle University Business School ( email )

5 Barrack Rd
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE
United Kingdom

Nikhil Srivastava

Bennett University ( email )

Plot Nos 8-11, TechZone 2, Greater Noida, India
Uttar Pradesh 201310
Greater Noida, UT 201310
India

Zihe Wang

Independent ( email )

Ziheng Wang

Northwest Minzu University ( email )

China

Zihe Wang

University of Queensland ( email )

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