When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission

35 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2004

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

James J. Kim

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 22, 2004

Abstract

This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC.

Keywords: Lobbying, Transaction Cost Economics, Appropriability, Telecommunications

JEL Classification: H1, K2, L5

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M. and Kim, James J., When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission (March 22, 2004). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4483-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=521129 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.521129

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

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Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

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James J. Kim

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

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