How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks

25 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2004

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Brian S. Silverman

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 16, 2004

Abstract

This paper examines academic earmarks and its role in the funding of university research. It provides a summary and review of the evidence on the supply of earmarks by legislators. It then discusses the role of university lobbying for earmarks on the demand side. After a review of the literature of the impact of earmarks on research quantity and quality, the paper poses a number of public policy questions related to the funding of science.

Keywords: Lobbying, Education, Political Economy

JEL Classification: H52, I22

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M. and Silverman, Brian S., How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks (March 16, 2004). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4484-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=521130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.521130

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
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Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

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Durham, NC 27701
United States

Brian S. Silverman

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

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