Nuclear Deterrence Strategies and the Balance of Power in Europe

17 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2025 Last revised: 15 Apr 2025

See all articles by Chick Edmond

Chick Edmond

Old Dominion University - Graduate Program in International Studies; University of Bamenda

Date Written: April 14, 2025

Abstract

The beginning of the Cold War indubitably defines nuclear deterrence strategies in Europe by reinforcing and shaping security dynamics amongst European States. The balance of power in Europe has been geopolitically influenced by NATO and Russia. In a quest to maintain a strategic deterrence balance posture, this act as stabilizing factor in the region as well as preventing any future conflict in Europe resulting from security dilemma. NATO eastward enlargement has maintained a significant strategic balance of power in the region while Russia incursion into Ukraine, Georgia and Transnistria equally serves the same purpose. This strategic balance of power, help creates an effective deterrence between Russia and NATO thus, explaining why no war has existed between Moscow and Brussels. This paper uses the balance of power theory to justify how states embark on military strengths to enhance their deterrence capabilities according to John Mearsheimer. It also analysis nuclear deterrence mechanisms deployed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO and the Russian Federation in ensuring balance of power in Europe. By examining the nuclear deterrence strategies of both adversaries, the paper seeks to also to explore the loopholes created as a result of an ineffective security deterrence policy resulting to a security dilemma as seen in Ukraine 2022, Georgia 2008, Serbia 1999 and Moldova 1992.

Suggested Citation

Edmond, Chick, Nuclear Deterrence Strategies and the Balance of Power in Europe (April 14, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5218112 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5218112

Chick Edmond (Contact Author)

Old Dominion University - Graduate Program in International Studies ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://www.odu.edu/directory/edmond-chick

University of Bamenda ( email )

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Cameroon
237 233 366 033 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://uniba.cm/

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