Technology Adoption, Market Power, and the Dual Dynamics of Value Premium and Markups *

83 Pages Posted: 6 May 2025

See all articles by Xiaoji Lin

Xiaoji Lin

University of Minnesota

Chao Ying

Chinese University of Hong Kong

Terry Zhang

Australian National University (ANU)

Date Written: April 16, 2025

Abstract

This paper examines how technology adoption and market power jointly explain two significant macroeconomic trends in recent decades: the decline of the value premium and the rise of markups. Empirically, we demonstrate that these trends are predominantly concentrated among high-markup firms, whereas both the value premium and markups remain stable for firms with low markups. To rationalize these patterns, we develop a dynamic monopolistic competition model with endogenous technology adoption and strategic interactions. Our analysis highlights that the observed trends-and their cross-sectional divergence between high-and low-markup firms-emerge from two critical mechanisms: (1) the rising efficiency of the aggregate technology frontier over time, and (2) firm heterogeneity in technology adoption decisions and demand elasticity. The model replicates the empirical dynamics of markups and the value premium, underscoring the interplay between technological evolution and market structure.

Keywords: value premium, markup, technology adoption, technology frontier shocks

Suggested Citation

Lin, Xiaoji and Ying, Chao and Zhang, Terry, Technology Adoption, Market Power, and the Dual Dynamics of Value Premium and Markups * (April 16, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5219637 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5219637

Xiaoji Lin

University of Minnesota ( email )

420 Delaware St. SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Chao Ying (Contact Author)

Chinese University of Hong Kong ( email )

Cheng Yu Tung Building
12 Chak Cheung Street
Shatin, NT
Hong Kong

Terry Zhang

Australian National University (ANU) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

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