Climate Pledges and Greenwashing: Information Provision Does Not Work

25 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2025

See all articles by Vittoria Battocletti

Vittoria Battocletti

Bocconi University - Department of Law

Alfredo Desiato

Aston University

Alessandro Romano

Bocconi University

Chiara Sotis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Tobias H. Troeger

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 12, 2025

Abstract

Many firms are making net-zero and carbon neutral pledges. In principle, these pledges should help consumers identify sustainable options, but often they do not correspond to meaningful actions. In response, both in the U.S. and in Europe, courts and policymakers are requiring firms to disclose more information regarding their climate pledges. This strategy assumes that consumers pay attention to the information provided, are able to understand it, and adjust their behavior accordingly. We test this assumption in two studies with representative samples of U.S. residents (N = 300, N = 1500) and a large-scale eyetracking study (N = 500). First, we show that while people are not aware of the meaning of the most common climate pledges, they are willing to pay a considerable premium for these claims, confirming that an unregulated market may lead to greenwashing. Second, we observe that information provision does not affect respondents when making consequential choices on how much to pay for gift cards of firms that have made a climate pledge. Third, we find that in a realistic setting where respondents receive multiple pieces of information about various products, information regarding climate pledges attracts significant attention. However, it does not improve understanding of climate pledges and actually increases recipients’ confusion. Our results add to the growing evidence that individual frame interventions are not a viable shortcut to address systemic issues like global warming.

JEL Classification: K1, K2, K32, D82, D83, M38

Suggested Citation

Battocletti, Vittoria and Desiato, Alfredo and Romano, Alessandro and Sotis, Chiara and Tröger, Tobias Hans, Climate Pledges and Greenwashing: Information Provision Does Not Work (February 12, 2025). LawFin Working Paper No. 57, SAFE Working Paper No. 447, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5233205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5233205

Vittoria Battocletti

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Alfredo Desiato

Aston University ( email )

Alessandro Romano

Bocconi University ( email )

Chiara Sotis

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Tobias Hans Tröger (Contact Author)

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
+49 69 798 34391 (Phone)
+49 69 798 34536 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://bit.ly/3dQ93nd

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Law ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3 (Westend Campus)
Frankfurt, 60323
Germany
+49 69 798 34391 (Phone)
+49 69 798 34536 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/43940696/English-Version

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.global/users/tobias-tr%C3%B6ger

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