Effect of the GSIB Surcharge on the Systemic Risk Posed by the Activities of GSIBs

Abstract

This study assesses whether the introduction of the GSIB surcharge requirement resulted in GSIBs reducing the systemic risk posed by their activities. We find limited evidence of GSIBs managing their activities to avoid increases in their surcharges. For a sample of international banks, proximity to surcharge thresholds is associated to a decrease in the growth of intra-financial system liabilities, underwriting activities, and holdings of trading and available-for-sale securities. In the case of US GSIBs and the method 2 GSIB surcharge, we find some association between proximity to surcharge thresholds and a decrease in the growth of trading and available-for-sale securities and short-term wholesale funding.

Keywords: Bank capital requirements, Banking regulation, GSIB surcharge, Systemic risk

JEL Classification: G01, G18, G21