Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans

30 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2004

See all articles by Michael Rauscher

Michael Rauscher

University of Rostock - Department of Economics; University of Rostock - Faculty of Business Administration, Economics and Social Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: February 2004

Abstract

Is tax competition good for economic growth? The paper addresses this question by means of a simple model of economic growth in which a wasteful Leviathan state sets taxes and provides productive input. Wasteful behaviour is restricted by the voter, who reduces political support if her income is reduced. The intensity of tax competition is modelled via variation of a parameter measuring the mobility of the tax base. It is shown that the effects of increased mobility of the tax base on economic growth are ambiguous and that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which in this model equals the rate of intratemporal substitution between the government's own consumption and its political support, is a decisive variable in this context.

JEL Classification: D72, D73, F43, H21

Suggested Citation

Rauscher, Michael, Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans (February 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=523522

Michael Rauscher (Contact Author)

University of Rostock - Department of Economics ( email )

Ulmenstr. 69
Rostock, 18057
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-rostock.de/vwl

University of Rostock - Faculty of Business Administration, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Ulmenstr. 69
Rostock, 18057
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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