Fiscal Redistribution Risk in Treasury Markets

41 Pages Posted: 13 May 2025 Last revised: 26 May 2025

See all articles by Roberto Gomez Cram

Roberto Gomez Cram

London Business School

Howard Kung

London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

hlustig@stanford.edu Lustig

Stanford University

David Zeke

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2025

Abstract

Unfunded fiscal shocks are a significant source of risk premia in Treasury markets when central banks and governments decide to insulate taxpayers and expose bondholders' wealth to government funding needs. We illustrate this bond risk premium mechanism analytically in a two-agent model featuring monetary-fiscal interactions and a fraction of constrained agents. Surprise government transfer spending devalues real Treasury payoffs through fiscal inflation, while fiscal redistribution makes these high marginal utility states for bond investors, leading to risky government debt. We show that this fiscal redistribution mechanism can quantitatively explain the nominal term premium in a TANK framework.

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Suggested Citation

Gomez Cram, Roberto and Kung, Howard and Lustig, hlustig@stanford.edu and Zeke, David, Fiscal Redistribution Risk in Treasury Markets (May 2025). NBER Working Paper No. w33769, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5250734

Roberto Gomez Cram (Contact Author)

London Business School ( email )

Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Howard Kung

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Hlustig@stanford.edu Lustig

Stanford University

David Zeke

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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