Timing and Skewness of Information Revelation: Evidence on Information Structures and Compound Lotteries

38 Pages Posted: 13 May 2025

See all articles by Enrico Diecidue

Enrico Diecidue

INSEAD – Decision Sciences

Thomas Langer

University of Muenster - Finance Center

Sven Nolte

Radboud University

Sebastian Riedmiller

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Judith C. Schneider

Leibniz Universität Hannover - Faculty of Economics and Management

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Abstract

In a series of three experiments we investigate intrinsic preferences for timing and skewness of information resolution in a compound lottery (CL) and information structure (IS) environment. In the first experiment, we rule out predeterminedness, i.e., realization before making the decision, of the outcome as a driver of different timing preferences between environments. In the second experiment, we show that skewness preferences in a two-outcome setting differ between environments. In the third comprehensive experiment, we integrate all three dimensions (timing, skewness, and environment) into a three-outcome setting which allows a rigorous treatment of skewness. With respect to timing, participants prefer to receive information early in both environments. In case of a gradual resolution, participants strictly prefer positively skewed information in the IS environment, but symmetric information in the CL environment. Our results show that skewness and environment must be jointly taken into account when studying preferences for information resolution.

Keywords: Intrinsic Preferences, Gradual Information Revelation, Skewness, Information Structures, Compound Lotteries

Suggested Citation

Diecidue, Enrico and Langer, Thomas and Nolte, Sven and Riedmiller, Sebastian and Schneider, Judith C., Timing and Skewness of Information Revelation: Evidence on Information Structures and Compound Lotteries. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5252008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5252008

Enrico Diecidue

INSEAD – Decision Sciences ( email )

France

Thomas Langer

University of Muenster - Finance Center ( email )

Universitatsstr. 14-16
Muenster, 48143
Germany
+49 251 83 22033 (Phone)

Sven Nolte (Contact Author)

Radboud University ( email )

Nijmegen
Netherlands

Sebastian Riedmiller

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Judith C. Schneider

Leibniz Universität Hannover - Faculty of Economics and Management ( email )

Königsworther Platz 1
Hannover, 30167
Germany

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