Meaning at Work

66 Pages Posted: 14 May 2025

See all articles by Nava Ashraf

Nava Ashraf

London School of Economics

Oriana Bandiera

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Virginia Minni

University of Chicago

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 12, 2025

Abstract

We evaluate a firm's unusual, worker-centered, solution to the agency problem: enabling employees to reduce the cost of effort rather than pushing them with performance rewards. We randomize the roll-out of the firm's "Discover Your Purpose" intervention among 2,976 white-collar employees and evaluate their outcomes over two years. We find that performance increases because the low performers either leave the firm or improve in their current jobs. The trade-off between meaning and pay flattens as those with low meaning and high pay leave the firm. Treatment also reshapes stated priorities and reduces gender gaps in preferences and behaviors, including uptake of parental leave. A cost-benefit analysis reveals high returns that are shared between the firm and the employees through higher bonuses. Finally, we show that observational data obscure these gains, causing firms to underestimate the intervention's true value.

Keywords: worker motivation, worker performance, meaning-making, incentives

JEL Classification: J2, J3, M5, C93

Suggested Citation

Ashraf, Nava and Bandiera, Oriana and Minni, Virginia and Zingales, Luigi, Meaning at Work (May 12, 2025). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2025-67, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5253315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5253315

Nava Ashraf

London School of Economics ( email )

United Kingdom

Oriana Bandiera

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Virginia Minni (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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