Crypto Associations

55 Pages Posted: 14 May 2025

See all articles by James J. Park

James J. Park

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: May 14, 2025

Abstract

Crypto associations operate the digital ledgers known as blockchains. They generally do not choose to organize as traditional legal entities governed by well-established fiduciary duties. Instead, they claim to have no central manager and instead rely on economic incentive to spur decentralized governance. In litigation, crypto associations have contended that they owe no contractual or other legal obligation to their investors. Many courts have disagreed and found that crypto associations are partnerships or essentially limited partnerships that owe legal duties to purchasers of crypto assets. In doing so, they have rejected a strong version of contractualism that would permit investors to consent to an arrangement where they have no rights. Crypto associations highlight an additional reason for legal entities. Not only do entities lock in capital for long-term investment, as noted by corporate law scholars, they also lock in capital to help ensure that enterprises comply with their social obligations. As a substitute for an entity, crypto regulation should designate Developers that raise substantial funds by selling crypto assets as controllers of the crypto association that are accountable to crypto investors.

Keywords: : crypto, crypto assets, digital assets, organizational law, securities law, securities regulation, corporate law, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Park, James J., Crypto Associations (May 14, 2025). UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming); UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 25-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5254379 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5254379

James J. Park (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
114
Abstract Views
212
Rank
536,493
PlumX Metrics