The Shadow Price of "Public" Information

60 Pages Posted: 19 May 2025

See all articles by Ed deHaan

Ed deHaan

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Chanseok Lee

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Miao Liu

Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Suzie Noh

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: May 15, 2025

Abstract

Converting public information into stock picks is unlikely to be costless, yet the magnitude of public information processing costs is unknown. We quantify extra-marginal information costs for mutual fund managers by building an "AI analyst" that, using only public data, selectively improves each fund's portfolio each quarter. The AI analyst's incremental trading gains estimate the marginal value of hiring additional analysts and technology and, per standard theory, provide a lower-bound estimate of a manager's marginal information costs. Our AI analyst generates $17.1 million in incremental quarterly gains through 2020, indicating that managers faced at least $17.1 million in marginal costs. These estimated costs are large relative to the average fund's fees of just $3.6 million and alpha of $2.8 million. Moreover, the AI analyst reduces portfolio risk, outperforms 93 percent of managers over their lifetimes, and dominates managers across a broad range alternative performance benchmarks. These findings demonstrate that public information frictions are economically large and challenge the standard assumption of costless learning from public information.

Keywords: information costs, stock picking, asset managers, AI agents, mutual funds

JEL Classification: C45, C53, G11, G14, G17, G23, M41

Suggested Citation

deHaan, Ed and Lee, Chanseok and Liu, Miao and Noh, Suzie, The Shadow Price of "Public" Information (May 15, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5256379 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5256379

Ed DeHaan

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, 94305
United States

Chanseok Lee

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, 94305
United States

Miao Liu

Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Suzie Noh (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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