Should Governments Restrict Foreign Investments in Startups?

26 Pages Posted: 20 May 2025 Last revised: 2 Jun 2025

See all articles by Fiona Paine

Fiona Paine

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Richard Townsend

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Ting Xu

University of Toronto, Rotman School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 2025

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving policy landscape surrounding foreign investment restrictions in innovative startups. Drawing on recent research, we analyze both the security benefits and economic costs of policies like the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). The evidence suggests that foreign investments do facilitate measurable cross-border knowledge spillovers that may raise legitimate security concerns. However, restricting these investments imposes significant costs on domestic innovation ecosystems, including reduced capital availability, disrupted investor networks, and potentially diminished innovation outcomes. These effects extend well beyond directly targeted foreign investors to affect domestic venture firms and startups. We explore design considerations for more effective investment screening policies, including industry targeting, investor heterogeneity, and implementation approaches, as well as complementary policies that might address security concerns while minimizing costs to innovation. We conclude by outlining promising directions for future research on this increasingly important intersection of innovation policy and national security.

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Suggested Citation

Paine, Fiona and Townsend, Richard and Xu, Ting, Should Governments Restrict Foreign Investments in Startups? (May 2025). NBER Working Paper No. w33803, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5259639

Fiona Paine (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
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Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Richard Townsend

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Ting Xu

University of Toronto, Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/tingxu4

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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