A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union. Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice

17 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2004

See all articles by George Tridimas

George Tridimas

University of Ulster - School of Economics

Abstract

The paper examines the benefits the sovereign member states of the EU expect to derive by granting the European Court of Justice the power to review the collective policy making decisions of the EU legislative bodies. Using the methodology of constitutional political economy it investigates the one-country one-judge rule of judicial appointments in the ECJ, the restrictions imposed on litigants to access the ECJ and the limits on the jurisdiction of the ECJ to review EU legislation. It also analyses how the presence of judicial review affects the size of the policy measures taken by the policy makers.

Keywords: European Court of Justice, constitutional political economy, judicial review, judicial appointments, accessibility to court, jurisdiction of court, independent judiciary

JEL Classification: D72, D74, D78, K33, K41

Suggested Citation

Tridimas, George, A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union. Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=526682

George Tridimas (Contact Author)

University of Ulster - School of Economics ( email )

Shore Road
Newtownabbey
Co Antrim, Northern Ireland BT37 0QB BT37 0QB
United Kingdom

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