CEO Pay and Firm Performance

Abstract

Executive compensation, particularly Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay, continues to provoke intense debate regarding its justification and impact on firm performance. Despite substantial literature, the linkage between CEO remuneration and firm performance remains ambiguous and context-dependent. This study investigates the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, addressing concerns over pay-performance sensitivity and agency conflicts in corporate governance. The primary purpose of the study is to evaluate whether CEO compensation aligns with shareholder interests by enhancing firm performance, as measured by accounting (Return on Assets). Using a panel dataset of 147 publicly listed firms over ten years, a random effects model is employed to account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. CEO pay is disaggregated into fixed (salary) and variable (bonus, stock options) components to determine their differential effects on performance. Empirical results reveal a positive and significant relationship between variable pay and firm performance, indicating that performance-contingent compensation aligns managerial incentives with shareholder value creation. However, fixed pay shows no significant effect. The study also finds evidence of diminishing marginal returns to excessive pay, suggesting a threshold beyond which additional compensation yields no performance benefit. The study is limited by potential data unavailability on private firms, variations in pay disclosure quality, and the exclusion of non-financial performance measures. Despite these limitations, the findings provide practical implications for boards, compensation committees, and policymakers in designing performance-based pay structures that curb managerial opportunism and enhance firm value. Socially, the study contributes to the discourse on income inequality and corporate accountability. Original in its integrative approach and multi-dimensional performance analysis, this study contributes to the literature by offering nuanced insights into the structure of CEO pay and its conditional effect on firm performance. It advocates for balanced incentive schemes that promote long-term corporate sustainability and stakeholder confidence.

Keywords: CEO Pay, Firm Leverage, Firm Performance, Firm Size, Growth Opportunities