From Academia to the Courtroom: Impact of Academic Executives on Corporate Litigation Risk

42 Pages Posted: 29 May 2025

See all articles by Ping Liu

Ping Liu

Jinan University

Hanxiong Zhang

Bangor University

Zhongxiang Xu

China Institute of Finance and Capital Markets

Kai Xing

Nanchang University

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Abstract

Litigation is one of the most common risks a company may face during its operations. This study investigates whether executives with academic work experience (“academic executives”) reduce corporate litigation in China. We found that academic executives significantly reduce corporate litigation, especially when they reach critical mass on the board. Specifically, academic executives affect corporate litigation by intensifying the quality of internal controls and reducing earnings management. Further analyses showed that the effect of academic executives on corporate litigation is mainly because of executives with teaching experience in universities. Our findings shed light on the value of executives’ academic work experience in risk management and corporate governance in the context of the upper echelons and imprinting theories.

Keywords: Academic Experience, Litigation Risk, Critical mass, Executive Characteristics, earnings management

Suggested Citation

Liu, Ping and Zhang, Hanxiong and Xu, Zhongxiang and Xing, Kai, From Academia to the Courtroom: Impact of Academic Executives on Corporate Litigation Risk. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5274754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5274754

Ping Liu

Jinan University ( email )

Huang Pu Da Dao Xi 601, Tian He District
Guangzhou, 510632
China

Hanxiong Zhang

Bangor University ( email )

Zhongxiang Xu

China Institute of Finance and Capital Markets ( email )

Beijing
China

Kai Xing (Contact Author)

Nanchang University ( email )

999 Xuefu Avenue
Hong Gu Tan New District
Nanchang, 330031
China

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