Political Pressure Deflection
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-21
39 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2004
There are 2 versions of this paper
Political Pressure Deflection
Political Pressure Deflection
Date Written: February 2004
Abstract
Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes - political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to "sell" is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. US trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.
Keywords: Pressure Deflection, Elections, Antidumping
JEL Classification: D72, F13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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