Political Pressure Deflection

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-21

39 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2004

See all articles by James E. Anderson

James E. Anderson

Boston College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2004

Abstract

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes - political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to "sell" is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. US trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Keywords: Pressure Deflection, Elections, Antidumping

JEL Classification: D72, F13

Suggested Citation

Anderson, James E. and Zanardi, Maurizio, Political Pressure Deflection (February 2004). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=527551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.527551

James E. Anderson

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

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Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
617-552-3691 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Maurizio Zanardi (Contact Author)

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

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